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Abstract: In the last twenty years the concept and dynamics of trust has
come into focus of many social sciences. A concept of trust is widely iden-
tified as important to social interactions; however, it is rarely well defined
or characterized. The notion of trust is playing an important role especially
within the context of postmodern society, risk society. Making recourse to
third-party expertise and knowledge is required whenever a context requires
action, but one’s own experience and individual knowledge is inadequate. If
one’s own knowledge no longer suffices, the very act of trusting in some
extenal authority becomes a functional necessity. In the field of risk re-
search there is now general agreement that trust in risk management institu-
tions may be an important factor in perception and acceptance of risks.
Furthermore, trust is seen as the key to successful risk communication,
while distrust may be associated with stigmatization of technologies, such
as nuclear power, as well as social amplification effects following major
failures of risk regulation. While the transition from trust to distrust is often
rather abrupt and is reflected in a crisis of confidence, the reverse, the re-
gaining of trust, appears to be a slow and gradual process.
Key words: trust, credibility, risk management, risk communications,
public affairs.
1. Introduction: a concept of trust
Trust has become a popular research subject in the social sciences dur-
ing the last two decades. Trust is considered to lubricate social interactions
on various levels so that these function smoothly and harmoniously, it is
thought to reduce social uncertainty and complexity, and is seen to be an
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important element of social capital and as a prerequisite for a healthy and
flexible economy and democracy. (Tyler & Degoey, 1996)
Trust is a concept widely identified as important to social interactions,
but rarely well defined or characterized. Intellectual perspectives on trust
emanate from diverse academic disciplines – psychology, sociology, politi-
cal science, economics and mass communication. Theoretical conceptuali-
zations from these perspectives share a number of common features which
can shed light on different types of trust and how they develop among peo-
ple in social interactions. There are several distinctly different ways of de-
fining the trust:
‘A generalized expectancy held by an individual that the word, promise,
oral or written statement of another individual or group can be relied on’
(Rotter, 1980:1)
‘The generalized expectancy that a message received is true and reliable
and the communicator demonstrates competence and honesty by conveying
accurate, objective and complete information’ (Renn and Levine, 1991:181).
‘A set of expectations shared by all those involved in an exchange’
(Zucker, 1986:54).
‘Members of that system act according to and are secure in the expected
futures constituted by the presence of each other or their symbolic represen-
tations’ (Lewis and Weigert, 1985:975).
 ‘A person’s expectation that an interaction partner is able and willing to
behave promotively toward the person even when the interaction partner is
free to choose among alternative behaviours that could lead to negative con-
sequences for the person’ (Koller, 1988:266).
In very general terms, Rousseau et al. (1998) argue that trust can be de-
fined as: “a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerabil-
ity based upon the behavior of positive expectations of the intentions of or be-
havior of another” (p.395). Half a century ago, Hovland et al. (1953) identi-
fied competence and care as a base for interpersonal trust. In a series of ex-
periments they found that someone accepts information more readily when the
communicator is seen as an expert and when the communicator is seen as be-
ing trustworthy, in the sense that the source is seen as willing to communicate
the assertions he or she considers most valid (i.e., has no motives to promote a
particular view, interest or ideology, or has lack of intent to persuade).
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These definitions share some general themes, suggesting the need for a
broad-based, multidimensional conception of trust. Important attributes of
trust include the following:
• Expectations about others and orientations toward the future. Trust
allows people to interact and cooperate without full knowledge about others
and future uncertainties.
• A notion of chance or risk taking. To trust also implies that one has
confidence that others will act voluntarily in a manner that is beneficial,
even if not certain.
• Subjective perceptions about others and situations. These include per-
ceptions of the intentions and attributes of others (e.g. commitment, compe-
tence, consistency, integrity, honesty), their motivations, qualities of the
situation (e.g. the availability and accuracy of information), risks and un-
certainties. In risk communication programmes, trustworthiness can depend
on judgments about the quality of a message, its source, and the structure
and performance of institutions (Midden, 1988).
Within risk research, a wide range of theoretical (e.g., Renn & Levine,
1991; Kasperson et al., 1992; Johnson, 1999) and empirical studies have
been conducted to identify the core elements of trust. In other words, they
have examined what kind of evaluative judgments contribute to the creation
or destruction of trust in risk regulatory or other institutions. For example,
Kasperson et al. (1992) identified four key dimensions that play an impor-
tant role in the development and maintenance of trust: commitment, as so-
cial trust involves some degree of vulnerability, one wants to make sure that
the trustee is fully committed to the mission, goal or fiduciary obligation;
competence, since trust can only exist when a person or institution is com-
petent in the thing it is obliged to do, so that someone should not only be
committed to his or her fiduciary responsibilities, but should also fulfill it
competently; caring, a perception that an institution acts in a way that shows
concern for the people who put their trust in it; and finally predictability, in
that people tend to trust people or organizations that are consistent. Predict-
ability of arguments and behavior means that people know what to expect
from a particular person or organization.
On the other hand, Metlay (1999) has criticized researchers for making
discussions about trust unnecessarily difficult. His study of judgments of
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trust in the U.S. Department of Energy suggests that trust is not complex and
multifaceted, but a rather simple concept based on two distinctively different
components: 1. a tightly interconnected set of affective beliefs about institu-
tional behavior, which Metlay calls “trustworthiness”, and 2. perceptions of
how competent the institution is. Within the paradigm of “two-factor theory”
Frewer et al. (1996) found a structure that could best describe the reasons for
trusting or distrusting various information sources, later validated with a
more representative population sample. The first component comprised the
characteristics: truthful, good track record, trustworthy, favor, accurate,
factual, public welfare, responsible, knowledgeable, and (negatively) the
characteristics: distorted, proved wrong in the past, and biased. The second
factor consisted of the characteristics: accountable, self-protection, and a
vested interest versus sensationalism component.
Another theory suggests that for most people it is far too demanding to
base trust on evidence of competence and fiduciary responsibilities. Salient
value similarity theory by Earle and Cvetkovich (1995) says that social trust
is particularly critical where complex socio-technical systems generate risks
that are remote from everyday experience (social trust being the willingness
to rely on those who have responsibility for making decisions and taking ac-
tions related to the management of technology, the environment, medicine
or other realms of public health and safety). Under such complex circum-
stances trust is based on agreement and sympathy rather than on carefully
reasoned arguments or direct knowledge. In other words, people base their
trust judgments on whether they feel that the other person or organization
shares the same values, or is seen as having the same understanding of a
specific situation.
Salient value similarity theory claims that the social trust consists of two
key components: salient values and value similarity.
Salient value consists of the individual’s sense of what the important
goals (ends) and/or processes (means) are that should be followed in a par-
ticular situation. Salient values are an aspect of the individual’s understand-
ing of the meaning of a specific situation. The inferred meaning of a situa-
tion could include an understanding of what problem is being faced, what
options are available, and how effective each might be. The modifier “sali-
ent” was chosen to emphasize that the individual concludes that specific
values are important in one situation given its meaning, but that other values
may be important in another situation with a different meaning. (Siegrist,
Cvetkovich & Roth. 2000). Salient values are further characterized as being:
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1. Generalizations that might apply in more than one situation.
2. Potentially changeable in saliency. As inferred meaning changes so
will the saliency of values. Meaning could change, for example, as the indi-
vidual learns more about a particular hazard. Personal experiences, discus-
sions with family and friends, and media reports could all change the in-
ferred meaning of a technology and affect the saliency of values (Kasperson
& Kasperson, 1996; Renn et al., 1992).
3. Most often rapid, implicit, unarticulated, and automatically elicited
rather than slow, explicit, articulated, and arrived at on the basis of con-
trolled, systematic logical thought (Cvetkovich, 1999).
Judgments of value similarity involve:
1. A conclusion about the values that are salient for the person whose
trustworthiness is being judged. This attribution is made on the basis of that
person’s verbal statements, actions and/or identity (e.g., federal regulator,
nuclear plant operator).
2. A comparison of the similarity of the salient values of the perceiver
and the person being judged. (Siegrist, Cvetkovich & Roth. 2000).
Several studies have shown that judged salient value similarity is
strongly related to attributions of social trust (Cvetkovich & Löfstedt, 1999;
Earle & Cvetkovich, 1995, 1997, 1999). The meaning of the situation de-
termines which values are salient. It is possible to trust the government in
one domain where there is salient value similarity, and to distrust it in an-
other domain where there is salient value dissimilarity. It is hardly surpris-
ing, therefore, that general trust in politicians was found not significantly
related to risks perceived (Sjöberg, 1999).
While a number of functional theories attempt to explain what trust is,
few provide insight into the dynamics of trust at the level of society. Many
argue that trust is gained slowly through incremental increases stemming
from properly conceived and time acts on the part of each person in a rela-
tionship (Shapiro, 1987). The general social climate also structures the con-
ditions under which institutions must operate to gain or sustain trust. In a
positive social climate, people may invest more trust in institutions from the
beginning and may be more forgiving when this trust is abused. In a nega-
tive social climate, by contrast, people may be very cautious in investing
trust in any social institution (Renn and Levine, 1991).
Trust also depends heavily on the performance of social institutions.
Luhmann (1980) contrasted the interpersonal trust that prevails in small,
relatively undifferentiated societies with the system trust that prevails in the
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bureaucratic institutions of modern, complex societies; he argued that the
shifting nature of trust from the former to the latter is one of the hallmarks of
our times. It is also probably the case that trust in larger, more complex so-
cieties rests on higher levels of cognitive trust, whereas trust in smaller,
more immediate groups rests on higher levels of emotional trust (Lewis and
Weigert, 1985).
These conceptions contribute to several insights into the nature of social
distrust. Distrust appears to arise from violations of expectations that people
have in social relations, and it occurs on cognitive, affective or behavioral
levels. Violations of expectation, in turn, occur at both the individual level
(such as in close interpersonal relationships) and the social level (as when
politicians violate constituent expectations). Trust is hard to gain and easy to
lose, so, for example, Slovic et al. (1991b) noted that a single act of embez-
zlement is sufficient to convince us that an accountant is untrustworthy, and
that even 100 subsequent honest actions may do little to restore our trust in
the individual.
Trust is never completely or permanently attained, but instead requires
continuous maintenance and reinforcement. Distrust reflects the suspicion
that violated expectations in one exchange may generalize to other transac-
tions. To distrust, then, involves an attribution of intentionality that spreads
from limited cases through a broader realm of interactions or exchanges.
Renn and Levine (1991) distinguished five analytical levels related to trust
and confidence that vary in degree of complexity and abstraction: trust in-
volving a message, personal appeal, institutional perception, institutional
climate or sociopolitical climate. They argued that the lower levels (i.e. mes-
sage, personal appeal) are embedded in the higher ones (i.e. institutional
perception, institutional performance) and that conditions that operate on the
higher levels also affect lower levels of trust and confidence. Thus, consis-
tent violations of trust at lower levels will, they argued, eventually affect the
next higher level. Similarly, distrust at the higher levels will tend to shape
options for gaining or sustaining trust at the lower levels.
2. The role of trust within the context of the risk society
In the postmodern world, the principle of social responsibility, concept
of democratic governance and growing body of legislative documents en-
courage the public to take active part in the risk assessment and risk man-
agement processes. According to the words of Ulrich Beck, the reason for
such practice is that the contemporary society is the “Risk Society” and the
world of manufactured uncertainty, the society where in the first place we
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become more and more aware of the technological and scientific risks and
hazards we are surrounded with and, in the second place, the society where
such risks are rapidly increasing. The logic underlying modern industrial so-
cieties is changing from one based on the distribution of “good” aspects, in
the form of material products, to one based on the distribution of “bad” as-
pects, in the form of risks and unintended consequences (Beck, 1998). An-
thony Giddens speaks (1999) of “risk culture”, which can be seen as a new
imperative for modern society; we live in a society which is no longer turned
towards the past, but towards the future, in which individuals have acquired
considerable autonomy and are encouraged to take their lives in their own
hands - we must constantly think ahead and remain alert to both risks and
opportunities. In such society it is no wonder that the psychology and per-
ception of risk come into focus of the research.
Postmodern societies are characterized by the fact that they have
learned, to a certain extent, to tolerate the unexpected and to deal with un-
certainties. Thus, they have developed mechanisms for containing and cop-
ing with instances of uncertainty. We can take for an example the concept of
“calculated risk”. Probability theory was able to quantify potential risks be-
cause, in a world governed by causal relations, sufficient knowledge of rele-
vant factors made the uncertainties of the future estimable. (Reith, 2004)
In this context, trust is playing an eminent role. Making recourse to
third-party expertise and knowledge is required whenever a context requires
action, but one’s own experience and individual knowledge is inadequate.
This always occurs against the background of a perceived uncertainty and/or
a subjective lack of information. If one’s own knowledge no longer suffices,
the very act of trusting becomes a functional necessity. Trust is considered
important when tasks are too big or complex for individuals to manage
themselves (Earle & Cvetkovich, 1995). With more differentiation and spe-
cialization in a society, members have become more dependent on each
other. The division of labor comes with the expectation that people who
have a specific task or responsibility will perform their duty in a way that
others can count on. Although the division of labor has helped to substan-
tially reduce various risks, the society has become more vulnerable in cases
where duties are not properly being carried out. Trust is disappointed, if
certain information turns out to be wrong or misleading. While errors in the
theoretical, scientific dimension become “gaps of knowledge”, in the fac-
tual, social dimension, such errors result in “gaps of trust”. (European
Commission, 2006)
Contemporary discourse on trust in social sciences often makes re-
course to the theory of Anthony Giddens (1990). He points out that within
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an environment fraught with danger, all mechanisms of trust need to be
complemented with tangible trust in persons. Repeated and fundamental
errors and misjudgments may shake the generalized trust in the system to
such an extent that trust will be replaced by skepticism and distrust. While
trust will ease the pressure in the present, distrust, at its most extreme, will
paralyze all action. Every type of distrust will compel the present to en-
gage in a quest for reassuring knowledge – a quest that consumes both
time and resources. Nevertheless, it would be mistaken to generally per-
ceive distrust as a deficiency; in many instances (e.g. in dealing with dan-
gerous substances), distrust may be the rational course of the action (Euro-
pean commission, 2006).
3. Trust in the public sector risk management
Trust is particularly important in the public sector, as these institutions
often have the specific duty to protect the public from various risks. Trust in
public institutions to effectively regulate or control risks is generally seen as
an important factor in the acceptability of these risks (Poortinga W, Pidgeon
N, 2005).
In the field of risk research there is now general agreement that trust in
risk management institutions may be an important factor in perception and
acceptance of risks. Furthermore, trust is seen as the key to successful risk
communication, while distrust may be associated with stigmatization of
technologies, such as nuclear power, as well as social amplification effects
following major failures of risk regulation. An interesting example refers to
the protection of population against H1N1 virus (swine flu) where the re-
sponse of citizens to the official calls on vaccination was much higher in the
countries in which governments and responsible ministries and agencies had
high public credibility.
The ability to establish constructive communication will be determined,
in large part, by whether the audience perceives the communication to be
trustworthy and credible. Trust either refers to expected, future actions of
third parties, or to the reliability of information, on which current actions are
based. It is particularly relevant in conditions of ignorance or uncertainty
with respect to unknown or unknowable actions of other. In this respect,
trust concerns not future actions in general, but all future actions which con-
dition our present decisions (Gambetta, 2000).1
––––––––––
1 Gambetta, Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations, University of
Oxford – Department of Sociology, 2000, p. 217.
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Therefore, it could be said that trust is a strategy for dealing with un-
certainty. In the case of risky technologies, consumers and users trust sci-
ence to be capable of assessing risks; on the other hand, they put their trust
in industry and politics as regards their competence in taking action and
their capability to implement sensible and preventive risk management.
If it becomes apparent that industry and/or politicians did not adequately
communicate relevant information on risk potential, or even knowingly
withheld such information, the confidence of citizens, who were affected di-
rectly or indirectly, will be severely shaken. Accordingly, dialogue-based
risk communication could be the avenue for maintaining, stabilizing, or re-
gaining trust of the public or stakeholders (Ninkovic, Novak, Kesetovic,
forthcoming).
Trust is also very much a relational quality, influenced by, for instance,
perceived sincerity and integrity. On the one hand, this depends on the de-
gree of willingness (disposition for trust) of the respective “trust givers”
(citizens, consumers); on the other hand, it depends on the trustworthiness of
the respective “recipients of trust” (politicians, experts…). Trust is contin-
gent, it needs to be voluntary, and it cannot be proscribed through norms nor
demanded. The trust of citizens cannot be taken for granted or legislated, a
fact often overlooked (European commission, 2006).
However, many studies suggest that people evaluate government policy
as a whole, rather than specific policies or decisions on different issues. So,
rather than the evaluation of a specific institution or a decision, people may
assess the wider political and administrative system of risk governance
(Poortinga & Pidgeon. 2003).
Some newer studies question the importance of enhancing trust in in-
stitutions. That is, the public does not necessarily expect or see trust as an
achievable goal in their relation with institutions. Also, the importance of
full trust tends to be exaggerated, especially in democratic societies. The
public has become more competent and knowledgeable enough to have “ef-
fective” distrust. Such distrust is not destructive, but can be seen as an es-
sential component of political accountability in a participatory democracy.
What is frequently called trust or distrust exists along a continuum,
ranging from uncritical emotional acceptance to total rejection. Somewhere
in between a healthy type of distrust can be found - critical trust. Critical
trust can be conceptualized as a practical form of reliance on a person or in-
stitution combined with some healthy skepticism. Different degrees of gen-
eral trust can coexist with different degrees of skepticism. The situation in
which someone has high general trust in and is not skeptical about certain
institution can be said to be one of “trust”. One may be willing to rely on in-
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formation, but one is still somewhat skeptical, and thus may still question
the correctness of the received information. The situation, in which general
trust is low, combined with low skepticism, is labeled as distrust. Although
distrust is not a preferred situation, it could be contrasted to cynicism, a
situation in which one not only has no trust in a specific institution, but one
is also skeptical about its intentions. In the latter situation one is likely to
simply reject everything that comes from a particular organization
(Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003).
The proposed typology of trust raises some interesting questions both
for risk policy and the direction of future risk research. Decision makers
may confuse critical trust with distrust or rejection. However, they are not
the same thing, nor they demand the same responses.
While the transition from trust to distrust is often rather abrupt and is re-
flected in a crisis of confidence, the reverse, the regaining of trust, appears
to be a slow and gradual process (Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2005). Trust is easier to
destroy than to create or replace because negative events are more noticeable
and carry more weight than positive ones.
The following peculiarities are relevant in the area of risk communica-
tions (European Commission, 2006):
1. Building trust is always a hybrid process; there is no clear distinction
between “abstract” trust in the system and “tangible” trust in persons. Every
agency or organization communicates through actual, visible representa-
tives; and these may appear more or less credible. Accordingly, confidence-
building measures implemented by institutions benefit from the trust given
to identifiable personalities, e.g. politicians or other spokespersons. How-
ever, the trustworthiness of an actual spokesperson can be compromised by
the affiliation with a less than trustworthy organization.
2. Trust in abstract systems is not sufficiently grounded in personal or
expert knowledge; rather it is based on symbolic indicators of trustworthi-
ness. Among variables we can count the supposed capability (competence
and efficiency), integrity (independence and social responsibility), and the
reliability of the respective institution, as well as the availability of the in-
formation provided. In each new instance, trustworthiness must be newly
established afresh; however, even if risk regulation and risk communication
have been successful, stakeholders do not automatically confer trustworthi-
ness to the risk regulating institution itself.
3. Trust requires options for controls and enforcement. Trust is volun-
tary; it is given under the condition of the confidence in and the fairness of
the one receiving it. In order to be certain that trust was justified, there need
to be control mechanisms; i.e. transparency and continuous flow of infor-
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mation are required. If it becomes apparent that trust was unjustified, trust
can be withdrawn. The withdrawal of trust can result in unambiguous, pre-
defined consequences; e.g. politicians will be forced to step down or the old
institutions will be replaced with the new ones. When things have escalated
to this point, stakeholders need to be involved in the process of risk commu-
nications, in order to regain trust in the risk management of companies or
governments.
4. Whether information is perceived as trustworthy or untrustworthy
depends on its source. There are fundamental doubts about the credibility
and trustworthiness of
a. Science experts (both as regards their expertise and their integrity)
b. Industry culprits (due to the assumption of vested interests)
c. Politicians (perceived as often incapable of action or biased).
The higher the assumed neutrality or independence of the communica-
tors, the greater their trustworthiness. Confidence and trust of the
stakeholders depend on the profit status; the more a particular agent stands
to profit from a particular situation, the less trust will be given by the public.
The studies from the USA and Western Europe showed that the highest
marks are achieved by one’s family and friends, NGOs (doubtful in Serbia),
consumer protection associations, food monitoring agencies, and scientists
and university research institutions; followed by ministries/agencies and
politicians, and at the bottom of the scale, manufacturers and industry.
5. The willingness to trust is dependent on the reporting by the media.
Information as well as assessment criteria as regards new technologies and
their potential risks are interpreted and relayed by the media. The presenta-
tion by the media provides orientation both on the risk potential and on the
trustworthiness of the agents involved.
The more inquiries by the media unearth previously held-back informa-
tion, the more peoples’ trust will be called into question. By necessity, re-
porting in the media is shaped by time constraints and the need to be on top
of the news; it is also selective. Given these conditions, the logic of bad
news is good news; the tendency to dramatization becomes more acute, es-
pecially in the case of environmental crises. This poses a serious challenge
for risk communications, as “negative information” impacts greatly on trust,
whilst positive information has much less impact.
The trust and credibility can be built by using support from credible
third party sources. A lower credibility source takes on the credibility of the
highest credible source that agrees with its position on an issue. When a
lower credibility source attacks the credibility of a higher credibility source,
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the lower credibility source loses the additional credibility. It is important to
remember that the only information source that can effectively attack the
credibility of another source is one of equal or higher credibility (Covello &
Sandman, 2001).
Sometimes confusing terms risk and crisis, Covello and Allen give five
practical rules for building trust and credibility (Covello & Allen, 1988):
1. Accept and involve the public as a partner. Work with and for the
public to inform, dispel misinformation and, to every degree possible, allay
fears and concerns.
2. Appreciate the public’s specific concerns. Statistics and probabilities
do not necessarily answer all questions. Be sensitive to people’s fears and
worries on a human level. Your position does not preclude your acknowl-
edging the sadness of an illness, injury, or death. Do not overstate or dwell
on tragedy, but do empathize with the public and provide answers that re-
spect their humanity.
3. Be honest and open. Once lost, trust and credibility are almost impos-
sible to regain. Never mislead the public by lying or failing to provide in-
formation that is important to their understanding of issues.
4. Work with other credible sources. Conflicts and disagreements
among organizations and credible spokespersons create confusion and breed
distrust. Coordinate your information and communications efforts with those
of other legitimate parties.
5. Meet the needs of the media. Never refuse to work with the media.
The media’s role is to inform the public, which will be done with or without
your assistance. Work with the media to ensure that the information they are
providing the public is as accurate and enlightening as possible.
Finally, a high level of trust of general public is of the utmost impor-
tance for all aspects of police work. It is a necessary precondition for citi-
zens to accept the police and cooperate with the police. Without this accep-
tance and cooperation the police cannot be efficient and effective, regardless
of the modern equipment (Kesetovic, 2000). By the very nature of its func-
tion in society, the police often use risk communication that converts into
crisis communication whenever important values are put into jeopardy.
Credibility of the police organization and its top management, and trust of
the citizens predominantly influence success and effectiveness of this com-
munication.
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4. Conclusion
In brief, trust plays a key role in risk regulation; it is necessary to be cog-
nizant of the fact that the more pronounced the uncertainty (gap of knowl-
edge), the greater the need to establish a firm base for trust. On the other hand,
one of the major obstacles to effective risk communication is distrust. Sources
of distrust include disagreements among experts, lack of coordination among
risk management organizations, inadequate training of experts and spokesper-
sons in risk communication skills, insensitivity to the requirements for effec-
tive communication, public participation, dialogue and community outreach;
mismanagement and neglect; and a history of frequent distortion, exaggera-
tion, secrecy, or worse on the part of many risk information providers. A
complicating factor is that while industry and government risk communicators
often see the lack of trust and credibility as their central problem, activists
tend to see the undermining of undeserved trust as a major achievement.
As we already mentioned, the postmodern-risk society the negative as-
pects come into focus of the public interest. Unlimited sources and flow of the
information enables the average citizen to be well informed in basically every
issue he finds of any interest. The more informed and educated public be-
comes, the more developed attitudes it will have and the better decisions it
will make. Therefore, it is the objective and the task of adequate risk commu-
nication to create the necessary conditions for a “culture of trust” across all
levels. However, the aim cannot be a unilateral act of establishing trust among
the public; a “culture of trust” can only be established based on a symmetrical
approach. In this, the highest priority must be given to transparency, dialogue,
participation and fairness. A merely instrumental interpretation of risk com-
munication as a means to create trust among the public will be insufficient.
The best way to build public trust is by assuring that procedures truly involve
the public in decision making. Police managers should bear in mind this fact,
as police organizations often tend to function as closed systems.
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POVERENJE I KREDIBILITET U OBAVEŠTAVANJU O RIZIKU
Rezime
U poslednjih dvadeset godina, pojam i dinamika poverenja se nalaze u
žiži interesovanja društvenih nauka. Mada je pojam poverenja uopšteno per-
cipiran kao zna?ajan za društvene interakcije, on je, ipak, retko valjano defi-
nisan ili objašnjen. Ideja poverenja igra važnu ulogu u kontekstu postmoder-
nog društva ? društva rizika. Koriš?enje znanja i veštine tre?e strane je ne-
ophodno kad god kontekst zahteva akciju, a posedovano znanje i veština ni-
su dovoljni. Ako ne?ije li?no znanje nije dovoljno, sam ?in poverenja u neki
spoljašnji autoritet postaje funkcionalna nužnost. U oblasti prou?avanja rizi-
ka, danas postoji opšta saglasnost o tome da poverenje u institucije upravlja-
nja rizikom može biti zna?ajan ?inilac u percipiranju i prihvatanju rizika.
Štaviše, poverenje se smatra klju?em uspešne komunikacije rizika, dok ne-
poverenje može biti povezano sa stigmatizacijom tehnologije, kao što je, na
primer, nuklearna energija, kao i efektom socijalne amplifikacije nakon kru-
pnijih grešaka u upravljanju rizicima. Dok je prelazak s poverenja u nepove-
renje ?esto nagao i trenutan, a o?itava se u krizi kredibiliteta, obratni ?in, to
jest, ponovno uspostavljanje poverenja je spor i postepen proces.
